{"id":5891,"date":"2026-06-03T15:30:51","date_gmt":"2026-06-03T15:30:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/alrashidi.law\/?p=5891"},"modified":"2026-06-03T15:30:51","modified_gmt":"2026-06-03T15:30:51","slug":"learn-about-the-grounds-for-setting-aside-an-arbitral-award-under-saudi-law","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/alrashidi.law\/en\/learn-about-the-grounds-for-setting-aside-an-arbitral-award-under-saudi-law\/","title":{"rendered":"Learn About The Grounds For Setting Aside An Arbitral Award Under Saudi Law"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Arbitration has long occupied a position of considerable significance within the Saudi legal tradition, rooted as it is in the principles of Hanbali Islamic jurisprudence \u2014 a tradition in which the resolution of disputes through consensual arbitral processes predates modern codification by centuries. The Kingdom&#8217;s early and proactive legislative engagement with arbitration is itself noteworthy: it was among the first states in the region to enact a formal arbitration law, doing so in 1403 AH (1983 CE) (2). The current legislative framework, established by Royal Decree No. (M\/34) dated 24\/5\/1433 AH, together with the Enforcement Law enacted in the same year (3), represents a qualitative and philosophically significant advance \u2014 one that deliberately aligns the Kingdom&#8217;s arbitral framework with the international standards enshrined in the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.<\/p>\n<p>Within this framework, Articles 49 through 53 of the Arbitration Law address a question of fundamental importance to the integrity of the arbitral process: in what circumstances may an arbitral award be impugned and set aside? The Law&#8217;s answer is deliberate in its structure \u2014 an exhaustive, closed list of grounds, leaving no residual discretion to challenge awards on bases not expressly enumerated. This approach is further integrated with the Sharia proceedings system and the implementing regulations of the Arbitration Law, reflecting a carefully calibrated legislative philosophy: one that champions arbitration as an effective and efficient means of dispute resolution while preserving a minimum but meaningful threshold of judicial oversight, in the service of the rule of law, the administration of justice, and the protection of public order.<\/p>\n<p>Three questions accordingly frame the analysis: Does nullity constitute an exception to the principle of the finality of arbitral awards? What are the prescribed grounds for nullity under the Saudi system? And what are the legal consequences that flow from a judgment declaring an arbitral award null and void?<\/p>\n<h2><strong>First: Nullity as an Exception to the Principle of Finality<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>The finality of arbitral awards is a cornerstone principle of arbitration law across all major international systems and institutional frameworks. Arbitral awards are, as a general rule, not susceptible to challenge through the ordinary avenues of appeal available in respect of court judgments. It is precisely this characteristic \u2014 the immunity of arbitral awards from ordinary appellate review \u2014 that confers upon arbitration much of its practical utility and its appeal as a mechanism for resolving complex commercial and investment disputes.<\/p>\n<p>Nevertheless, no legal system operates without a safety valve. In recognition of the imperative to protect the public order of the state and to guard against manifest injustice, legislators and institutional regulators have universally provided for a narrowly circumscribed procedure by which an arbitral award may be challenged: the action to set aside. This action is not an appeal on the merits; it is a procedural mechanism of last resort, available only on defined and limited grounds.<\/p>\n<p>The Saudi Arbitration Law is entirely consistent with this international approach. It expressly provides that arbitral awards rendered in accordance with its provisions are not subject to challenge by any means of ordinary appeal, save only for the filing of an action to set aside (4). This formulation is deliberate: the finality of the award is preserved as the rule; the action to set aside is the tightly bounded exception.<\/p>\n<p>An action to set aside must be instituted within sixty days of the date on which the party concerned was notified of the award. Significantly, a pre-award waiver by a party of its right to bring such an action does not operate as a bar to the acceptance of the action \u2014 the right subsists notwithstanding any such prior waiver (5). Conversely, a post-award waiver is treated with considerably less indulgence: where a party waives its right to bring an action to set aside after the award has been rendered, that waiver is effective and the action will not be entertained (6).<\/p>\n<h2>Second: The Grounds for Setting Aside an Arbitral Award<\/h2>\n<p>The Arbitration Law enumerates, by way of an exhaustive and non-extendable list, the grounds upon which an action to set aside an arbitral award may be brought. These grounds are as follows:<\/p>\n<p><strong>1. Absence, Invalidity, Voidability, or Lapse of the Arbitration Agreement:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>This ground pertains to the foundational instrument upon which the entire arbitral process rests. It encompasses circumstances in which no valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties, including cases in which the parties have mutually agreed to rescind the underlying contract in its entirety \u2014 thereby extinguishing the arbitration clause embedded within it \u2014 or in which the contract containing the arbitration agreement is found to be absolutely void ab initio (7).<\/p>\n<p><strong>2. Legal Incapacity or Partial Incapacity of a Party at the Time of Conclusion of the Arbitration Agreement:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The validity of an arbitration agreement, as with any contractual instrument, is contingent upon the full legal capacity of the parties at the time of its conclusion. This ground captures circumstances in which consent to the arbitration clause or agreement was given by a person wholly lacking legal capacity \u2014 such as a person of unsound mind \u2014 or by a person whose legal capacity was restricted at the material time, such as a person subject to guardianship by reason of prodigality or insolvency (8).<\/p>\n<p><strong>3. Violation of the Right to be Heard and to Present a Defense:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>This ground gives expression to one of the most fundamental principles of procedural justice: the right of every party to be heard. It is engaged where a party to the arbitration was deprived of the opportunity to present its defense as a result of a failure to provide proper and timely notification of the appointment of the arbitrators or of the arbitral proceedings and their scheduled dates, or by reason of any other circumstance beyond that party&#8217;s control that prevented meaningful participation. It equally encompasses any failure to afford the parties equal and adequate opportunity to present their respective cases (9).<\/p>\n<p><strong>4. Failure of the Arbitral Tribunal to Apply the Rules Agreed Upon by the Parties:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The autonomy of the parties is a foundational principle of arbitration, and the arbitral tribunal is bound to apply the procedural and substantive rules that the parties have designated as governing their dispute. Any departure by the tribunal from those agreed rules \u2014 whether by disregarding them entirely or by substituting different rules without the parties&#8217; consent \u2014 constitutes a valid and cognisable ground for the annulment of the award.<\/p>\n<p><strong>5. Irregular Constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal or Irregular Appointment of Arbitrators:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>This ground addresses defects in the composition of the tribunal itself. The arbitral tribunal must be constituted, and its members appointed, in strict conformity with the applicable arbitration rules and the agreement of the parties. A paradigmatic example of such irregularity is the appointment of an arbitrator who fails to satisfy the qualifications expressly prescribed by the arbitration rules governing the proceedings (10).<\/p>\n<p><strong>6. The Arbitral Award Exceeds the Scope of the Arbitration Agreement:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is defined and delimited by the arbitration agreement; the tribunal may not adjudicate upon matters falling outside the scope of what the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration. Where an award addresses matters ultra vires the arbitration agreement, it is susceptible to challenge on this ground. However, where the offending portions of the award are severable from the portions that properly fall within the tribunal&#8217;s jurisdiction, the nullity is confined to the ultra vires portions alone, leaving the remainder of the award intact and enforceable.<\/p>\n<p><strong>7. Non-Compliance with Formal and Procedural Requirements Affecting the Substance of the Award:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>An arbitral award must satisfy certain formal and procedural requirements, the non-observance of which \u2014 where it affects the substance of the award \u2014 constitutes a ground for annulment. These requirements include the obligation that the award be rendered in writing, that it be reasoned, that it bear the signatures of the arbitrators, that it be issued by a majority rather than a minority of the tribunal, and that \u2014 where the tribunal is constituted by an equal number of arbitrators \u2014 it not be issued without a casting vote. The award is equally susceptible to challenge where it is founded upon arbitral proceedings that are themselves procedurally invalid in a manner that has affected the award (11)(12).<\/p>\n<p><strong>8. Contravention of the Provisions of Islamic Law, Public Policy, or Non-Arbitrability \u2014 Raised Ex Officio by the Court:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>In addition to the foregoing grounds, which may be raised by the parties, the competent court hearing the nullity action is under a positive obligation to declare the arbitral award null and void on its own initiative \u2014 irrespective of whether any party has raised the point \u2014 where the award is found to contain anything contrary to the provisions of Islamic Sharia law or to the public policy of the Kingdom, where it departs from what the parties themselves agreed, or where the subject matter of the dispute is one that is not susceptible to arbitration under the applicable law (13).<\/p>\n<h2><strong>Third: The Legal Consequences of a Judgment Declaring an Arbitral Award Null and Void<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>The issuance of a judgment setting aside an arbitral award gives rise to a number of legally significant consequences, of which the most important concerns the fate of the arbitration agreement itself.<\/p>\n<p>A defining feature of the Saudi arbitration framework \u2014 consistent with the internationally recognised doctrine of separability \u2014 is that the arbitration agreement does not automatically lapse or terminate upon the issuance of a judgment setting aside the award. The arbitration agreement retains its legal force and continues to produce its effects, unless one of two conditions is met: either the parties to the arbitration have expressly agreed in advance that the agreement shall terminate upon the issuance of a judgment of nullity, or the competent court has issued a judgment expressly and specifically setting aside the arbitration agreement itself (14). In all other circumstances, the agreement endures, leaving the parties free to recommence arbitral proceedings for the determination of their dispute.<\/p>\n<p>As regards the procedural consequences of the nullity judgment: where the competent court issues a judgment setting aside the arbitral award, that judgment is itself susceptible to appeal, and any such appeal must be lodged within thirty days of the day following service of the judgment. Conversely, where the court issues a judgment upholding the arbitral award and ordering its enforcement, that judgment is final and conclusive and is not subject to challenge by any means of appeal whatsoever (15).<\/p>\n<h2><strong>Summary<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>This article has traced the legislative evolution of arbitration law in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, charting the Kingdom&#8217;s progressive adoption of modern international standards designed to achieve an optimal balance between the efficient resolution of disputes and the preservation of meaningful judicial oversight. The analysis has focused in particular on the action to set aside an arbitral award as the sole legally available mechanism for challenging an arbitral award \u2014 a mechanism whose availability is strictly confined to the exhaustive list of grounds enumerated in the Arbitration Law. Those grounds encompass a range of jurisdictional, procedural, and substantive defects: the absence or invalidity of the arbitration agreement, lack of legal capacity, violation of due process rights, non-application of agreed rules, irregular constitution of the tribunal, excess of jurisdiction, non-compliance with formal requirements, and contravention of Islamic law and public policy. The article has further examined the procedural framework governing the institution of such actions, including the applicable time limits and the legal consequences that attend a judgment of nullity. Critically, the analysis confirms that the arbitration agreement retains its legal validity and force notwithstanding the annulment of the award, save only where the parties have expressly agreed otherwise or where the agreement itself has been the subject of an express judicial order of annulment \u2014 a principle that reflects the enduring vitality of party autonomy as a cornerstone of the arbitral process.<\/p>\n<h3><strong>Questions<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><strong>Are arbitral awards final?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The finality of arbitral awards is one of the most deeply entrenched principles of arbitration law, universally recognised across all major international systems, institutional frameworks, and national legislation \u2014 including, unequivocally, the Saudi legal system. Arbitral awards are, as a general rule, immune from challenge through the ordinary channels of appellate review that are available in respect of court judgments. It is this very characteristic that lies at the heart of arbitration&#8217;s appeal as a mechanism for dispute resolution: the parties&#8217; acceptance of a binding, final, and enforceable determination without the prospect of protracted appellate litigation.<\/p>\n<p>The Saudi legislator has given full and faithful expression to this principle. Under the Arbitration Law, the action to set aside constitutes the sole and exclusively available means by which an arbitral award may be subjected to any form of judicial review \u2014 and even this mechanism is extraordinary in character, tightly circumscribed in its grounds, and subject to a strict time limit of sixty days running from the date on which the party concerned was notified of the award.<\/p>\n<p>It warrants particular emphasis that the competent court is also vested with the authority to intervene of its own motion \u2014 without any application by the parties \u2014 to declare an arbitral award null and void in the following circumstances:<\/p>\n<p>Where the award contains provisions contrary to the principles of Islamic Sharia law or to the public policy of the Kingdom.<\/p>\n<p>Where the award departs from or contravenes what the parties themselves expressly agreed.<\/p>\n<p>Where the subject matter of the dispute falls within a category of matters that are not susceptible to arbitration under the applicable law.<\/p>\n<p>These ex officio powers of the court reflect the legislator&#8217;s determination to preserve a minimum but non-negotiable threshold of judicial oversight, in the service of Sharia compliance, public order, and the broader integrity of the legal system.<\/p>\n<p><strong>What is the time limit for filing an action to set aside an arbitral award?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The statutory period within which an action to set aside an arbitral award must be instituted is sixty days, commencing from the date on which the party seeking annulment was formally notified of the award. This limitation period is strictly observed and must be understood in light of the following ancillary rules:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Effect of a Pre-Award Waiver:<\/strong> A waiver by a party of its right to bring an action to set aside, executed prior to the issuance of the arbitral award, does not operate as a procedural bar to the subsequent acceptance of such an action. The right survives any such antecedent waiver, and the action remains competent within the sixty-day period following notification.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Effect of a Post-Award Waiver:<\/strong> The position is fundamentally different where the waiver is executed after the arbitral award has been rendered. In such circumstances, the waiver is legally effective and conclusive: the action to set aside will not be entertained, and the party is deemed to have irrevocably relinquished its right of challenge.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Appeal of a Nullity Judgment:<\/strong> Where the competent court issues a judgment declaring the arbitral award null and void, that judgment is itself open to appeal. Any such appeal must be lodged within thirty days of the day immediately following service of the nullity judgment upon the parties.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>What are the seven grounds specified by the law, by way of exhaustiveness, that permit the filing of a nullity action within the sixty-day period?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Article 50 of the Saudi Arbitration Law enumerates, in exhaustive and non-extendable terms, seven exclusive grounds upon which the parties to a dispute may institute an action to set aside an arbitral award within the prescribed sixty-day limitation period. These grounds are as follows:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>1. Absence or Invalidity of the Arbitration Agreement:<\/strong> The action lies where no valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties, or where any such agreement \u2014 though once valid \u2014 is void, voidable, or has lapsed by reason of the expiration of its term, thereby depriving the arbitral tribunal of the consensual jurisdictional foundation upon which its authority rests.<\/li>\n<li><strong>2. Lack of Legal Capacity:<\/strong> The action lies where one of the parties to the arbitration agreement lacked full legal capacity at the time of its conclusion, whether by reason of a total absence of legal capacity \u2014 as in the case of a person of unsound mind \u2014 or by reason of a restriction upon that capacity as determined by the law applicable to the party&#8217;s legal status, such as a person subject to legal guardianship or incapacity proceedings.<\/li>\n<li><strong>3. Violation of the Right to Present a Defense:<\/strong> The action lies where a party was deprived of the opportunity to present its defense in the arbitral proceedings, whether as a result of a failure to provide proper and timely notification of the appointment of the arbitrators or of the scheduling of the arbitral proceedings, or by reason of any other circumstance falling outside that party&#8217;s control that effectively prevented meaningful participation in the process.<\/li>\n<li><strong>4. Disregard of Rules Agreed Upon by the Parties:<\/strong> The action lies where the arbitral award disregards or excludes the application of rules \u2014 whether procedural or substantive \u2014 that the parties had expressly agreed should govern the subject matter of the dispute. The tribunal&#8217;s mandate is defined and bounded by the parties&#8217; agreement, and any material departure from the agreed framework constitutes a cognisable ground for annulment.<\/li>\n<li><strong>5. Irregular Constitution of the Tribunal or Irregular Appointment of Arbitrators:<\/strong> The action lies where the arbitral tribunal was constituted, or its members appointed, in a manner inconsistent with the applicable arbitration rules or the express agreement of the parties. A representative example is the appointment of an arbitrator who fails to satisfy the qualifications prescribed by the rules governing the proceedings \u2014 a defect that goes to the root of the tribunal&#8217;s legitimate composition.<\/li>\n<li><strong>6. Excess of Jurisdiction \u2014 Award Addressing Matters Beyond the Scope of the Arbitration Agreement:<\/strong> The action lies where the arbitral award adjudicates upon matters that fall outside the scope of the arbitration agreement and were not submitted by the parties to the tribunal&#8217;s jurisdiction. Where, however, the ultra vires portions of the award are severable from the portions that properly fall within the tribunal&#8217;s jurisdiction, the nullity is confined to the former, and the remainder of the award retains its validity and enforceability.<\/li>\n<li><strong>7. Non-Compliance with Formal and Procedural Requirements Affecting the Substance of the Award:<\/strong> The action lies where the arbitral tribunal failed to observe the formal and procedural requirements that an award must satisfy, in a manner that affects the substance of the determination. Such failures include the omission of written reasons, the failure to render the award in writing, the absence of the arbitrators&#8217; signatures, the issuance of the award by a minority of the tribunal, or the issuance of the award by an equally divided tribunal in the absence of a casting vote. The action equally lies where the award is founded upon arbitral proceedings that are themselves procedurally invalid in a manner that has materially affected the outcome.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In addition to these seven party-initiated grounds, the competent court is under a positive duty to declare the arbitral award null and void of its own motion \u2014 without any application by the parties \u2014 where the award is found to be repugnant to the provisions of Islamic Sharia law or to the public policy of the Kingdom, or where the subject matter of the dispute is one that is not legally susceptible to arbitration under the applicable regulatory framework.<\/p>\n<p><strong>What is the effect of the invalidity of the arbitral award on the arbitration agreement itself \u2014 does the agreement survive or terminate upon the issuance of the nullity judgment?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>A defining and analytically significant feature of the Saudi arbitration framework is its adherence to the internationally recognised doctrine of the separability \u2014 or independence \u2014 of the arbitration clause. Under this doctrine, the arbitration agreement is treated as legally distinct from and independent of the underlying contract in which it is embedded, and equally distinct from any judgment rendered in relation to the arbitral award issued pursuant to it. Accordingly, the mere issuance of a judgment by the competent court declaring an arbitral award null and void does not, of itself and without more, cause the arbitration agreement to lapse, terminate, or otherwise cease to produce its legal effects.<\/p>\n<p>The arbitration agreement therefore survives the nullity judgment and remains in full force, with the consequence that the parties retain the right and the ability to recommence arbitral proceedings for the substantive resolution of their dispute. This outcome obtains in all cases save two narrowly defined exceptions:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Express Prior Agreement of the Parties:<\/strong> Where the parties have agreed in advance \u2014 whether in the arbitration agreement itself or in a separate instrument \u2014 that the arbitration agreement shall terminate upon the issuance of a judgment declaring the arbitral award void, that agreement governs, and the arbitration clause is extinguished accordingly upon the issuance of the nullity judgment.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Express Judicial Annulment of the Arbitration Agreement:<\/strong> Where the competent court issues a judgment that expressly and specifically addresses and invalidates the arbitration agreement itself \u2014 as may occur, for example, where the ground for the annulment of the award is the invalidity or lapse of the original arbitration agreement \u2014 the agreement is extinguished by force of that judicial determination.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Outside these two exceptional circumstances, the arbitration agreement endures in its full legal force, preserving the parties&#8217; access to the arbitral forum and their ability to seek a fresh and final determination of the merits of their dispute through arbitration<\/p>\n<h3><strong>Sources:<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p>Abdul Hamid Al-Ahdab, Arbitration in Arab States, Kluwer, 2nd ed., 1999, p. 13.<\/p>\n<p>The repealed Arbitration Law issued by Royal Decree No. M\/46 dated 12\/7\/1403 AH, corresponding to 25\/4\/1983 AD.<\/p>\n<p>The Arbitration Law issued by Royal Decree No. (M\/34) dated 24\/5\/1433 AH, corresponding to 16\/4\/2012 AD, and the Enforcement Law issued by Royal Decree No. (M\/53) dated 13\/8\/1433 AH, corresponding to 3\/7\/2012 AD.<\/p>\n<p>Article (49) of the Arbitration Law.<\/p>\n<p>The first paragraph of Article (51) of the Arbitration Law.<\/p>\n<p>Article (18) of the Executive Regulations of the Arbitration Law issued by Cabinet Decision No. (541) dated 26\/8\/1438 AH.<\/p>\n<p>Prof. Dr. Saad Al-Thiyabi and Dr. Alaa Al-Din Eid Atta, Commercial Arbitration (Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) with an Analytical Study of Selected Judicial Rulings, Dar Al-Kitab Al-Jami&#8217;i, Riyadh, First Edition 1444 AH, 2023 AD, p. 245.<\/p>\n<p>Dr. Turki bin Abdullah bin Aqil Al-Tayyar, &#8220;Provisions on the Grounds for the Nullity of an Arbitration Award in the Saudi Arbitration Law (A Comparative Applied Study with Islamic Jurisprudence),&#8221; Journal of Arab Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3, published in June 2025, p. 1233.<\/p>\n<p>Sheikh Abdullah bin Muhammad Al-Khinin, Al-Tafhim fi Sharh Nizam al-Tahkim, Dar al-Hadara, Riyadh, First Edition, 1441 AH \/ 2020 CE, pp. 292\u2013293.<\/p>\n<p>Sheikh Abdullah bin Muhammad Al-Khinin, Al-Tafhim fi Sharh Nizam al-Tahkim, Dar al-Hadara, Riyadh, 1st edition, 1441 AH \/ 2020 CE, p. 291.<\/p>\n<p>Paragraph 1 of Article (50) of the Arbitration Law.<\/p>\n<p>The first paragraph of Article (42) of the Arbitration Law.<\/p>\n<p>Paragraph 2 of Article 50 of the Arbitration Law.<\/p>\n<p>Paragraph 3 of Article 50 of the Arbitration Law.<\/p>\n<p>Paragraph 2 of Article 51 of the Arbitration Law.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Arbitration has long occupied a position of considerable significance within the Saudi legal tradition, rooted as it is in the principles of Hanbali Islamic jurisprudence \u2014 a tradition in which the resolution of disputes through consensual arbitral processes predates modern codification by centuries. The Kingdom&#8217;s early and proactive legislative engagement with arbitration is itself noteworthy: [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":601,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"disabled","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"default","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"default","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"set","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"footnotes":""},"categories":[28],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5891","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-arbitration-and-dispute-resolution"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/alrashidi.law\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5891","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/alrashidi.law\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/alrashidi.law\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/alrashidi.law\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/alrashidi.law\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5891"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/alrashidi.law\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5891\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5895,"href":"https:\/\/alrashidi.law\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5891\/revisions\/5895"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/alrashidi.law\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/601"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/alrashidi.law\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5891"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/alrashidi.law\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5891"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/alrashidi.law\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5891"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}